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ABSTRACT This paper describes political culture of university students by using 
empirical data from quantitative research conducted in 2004. The research was part 
of a scientific-research project Youth and European Integration Processes, Institute 
for Social Research in Zagreb. The basic sample (N=2000) consisted of high-school 
students, employed, unemployed and university students. The subsample of univer-
sity students (N=446) and a control group (N=532) were extracted from the basic 
sample of youth representatives. The control group comprised high school students, 
employed and unemployed young people. The political culture of university stu-
dents is described using the indicators of political culture that were derived from 
Almond and Verba’s theoretical framework: interest in formal politics, support for 
democratic values and attitudes and trust in institutions. The analysis indicates that 
university students, compared to other youth (high school students, employed and 
unemployed), have more interest in politics, their acceptance of democratic values 
and attitudes is higher, but they lack trust in institutions. These findings indicate 
that the political culture of university students in Croatia, compared to that of other 
youth, has greater potential to contribute to democratic processes.
Key words: political culture, university students, youth, trust, democratic values, 
democratic attitudes.
Introduction
Today’s generation of Croatian young people was growing up in the period of eco-
nomic, political and cultural transition. The period was characterized by economic 
crime, general pauperization, war, social anomie and shiftless implementation of 
democratic principles combined with intensive retraditionalization based on nation-
alistic and patriarchal views. “Spiritual renewal” or re-invention of Croatian national 
identity as part of socio-cultural transition, used institutions such as media and educa-
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tion to restore historic mythology, traditional values, religion and emphasize national-
ist values (Baranović, 2000). In 2000 the center-left coalition won the parliamentary 
elections and set a new main objective of Croatian domestic and foreign affairs – the 
EU accession, that demanded more decisive steps towards building a democratic 
society. Thus, being an EU member implies well established and functioning socio-
structural and socio-cultural aspects of liberal democracy. Namely, liberal democracy 
can be defined as: “a system based on the principle ‘government of the people, by the 
people and for the people’, with multi-candidate elections, an independent judiciary 
and separation of powers, and an uncensored press, and committed to the principles 
of rule of law, the protection of human rights, tolerance, respect for the harm prin-
ciple, equality, and the neutrality of the state in matters of religion” (Ramet, 2007:4). 
However, despite the existence of formal structural democratic institutions, there is a 
need for creating political, economic and social space free of “informal institutions” 
such as corruption and clientelism that prevent the institutions from functioning ef-
fectively and by democratic laws. Thus, the culture could be a supporting as well as 
an inhibiting factor of the economic, commercial and social development (Rimac and 
Štulhofer, 2004; Mežnarić, 2006) which means that “specific norms and collective 
habits can, behind the façade of formal institutions, make a mockery of market and 
democratic competition” (Rimac and Štulhofer, 2004:305).
The existance and maintenance of democracy are defined by its socio-cultural 
aspect, more specifically – political culture. Political culture is not only a prerequi-
site for democratic society, but is also its consequence, since “cultural and political 
heritage, traditions, values, beliefs and attitudes shape the subjective orientation 
to politics” (Maldini, 2008:328), thus the political behavior of citizens and po-
litical elites. Important civil characteristics of an imaginary citizen of a successful 
democratic society should include belief in individual liberty and personal political 
choices of others, certain distrust of political authority but trust in fellow citizens, 
obedience whilst asserting rights against the state (Tessler, 2002). Citizens who 
support and share these values and are able to recognize their distortion and dis-
respect constitute one of the key factors of liberal democracy.
Political Culture and Youth
Implementation of formal democratic institutions is very important for consolida-
tion of liberal democracy and the process should be supported by the transfor-
mation of civic culture. That is, by the change of an individual’s relationship to 
political institutions, processes and symbols through civic or participative political 
culture that requires an informed, competent, responsible and active citizen (Ilišin, 
2008): the higher the level of civic culture, the higher level of democracy (Vester-
dal, 2007). Almond and Verba note that the democratic model of a participative 
political system requires corresponding political culture. However, the societies 
of new democracies face a difficult path of adopting democratic political culture 
for two reasons (Almond, Verba, 2000). The first are the active principles of civil 
culture in which the political elite is responsible for making decisions and setting 
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the norms for citizens’ attitudes and relations to government. The second reason 
that makes the adoption of democratic political culture difficult lies in objective 
obstacles: anachronous technologies and old social systems. This paper is focused 
on the first problem with the emphasis on values and attitudes of citizens, more 
specifically, university students in Croatia.
If we regard the youth of Croatia as a resource of society, in other words, view 
them as a mirror of dominant social values as well as actors of future social and 
value changes (Ilišin and Radin, 2007), it can be concluded that they are the key 
bearers of future democratic society development and adoption of related values. 
It is known that the young distance themselves from formal political participation 
and that a decreased interest in political matters is characteristic for this demo-
graphic. The reasons for that are various and complex and range from possible 
radical individualism of youth (Kestila-Kekkonen, 2009) to insufficient accessibility 
of parties for the young. However, young people should have a certain level of 
understanding of the foundations of democratic politics in order to recognize and 
distinguish democratic from undemocratic behavior in public spheres.
Croatian society’s attitude towards youth is quite distrustful and paternalistic, and 
there is a lack of youth representation in the public scene (Ilišin, 2008) which indi-
cates that the young are regarded as a problem and not as a resource. Although late 
adolescence is an age of special significance in political socialization, it has been 
hardened not only by the war, economic deprivation and global lack of youth’s 
interest in politics but also because of a value system change that was taking place: 
the new value system was not established fully and the old one was losing its le-
gitimacy in the society. Transitional period, although marked by somewhat incoher-
ent, changing system of values, created a space for intensified social and political 
engagement of youth. However, youth in Croatia didn’t make themselves visible 
as a relevant political subject. When it comes to political engagement, university 
students excel especially in periods of socio-historical turbulences, meaning that 
autonomous political organization of youth was usually led by university students. 
They differ from other young people in at least two aspects: being more likely to be 
active members of an organization (Badescu, Sum and Uslaner, 2004) and advan-
taged in sense of “superior socio-economic status compared with individuals whose 
parents have lower educational qualifications and incomes” (Adnanes, 2007:55). In 
other words, university students posses more cultural capital with regard to knowl-
edge, language and culture, differentially accessed and possessed which indicates 
that amount of cultural capital guides the decisions made and actions taken consid-
ering the continuation of education1 (Archer, 2005; Doolan, 2009).
1 Although this text is not aimed to define cultural capital of university students from our 
sample, it is necessary to make a short analysis of their social background in comparison 
with general population of Croatia. University students are mostly born and raised in urban 
areas (72.2%) according to this survey, while 57.1% of population in Croatia are from urban 
areas (Akrap, 2004). Students’ fathers level of education also significantly differs from gen-
eral population’s level of education. Elementary school or less is level of education of 40.4%, 
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Recent researches show that university students possess higher democratic poten-
tial than the rest of the youth (Ilišin, 2007, Ilišin 2008), which can be explained 
by their political culture that is not completely shared with other young people. 
Political culture is a set of “frequency of different kinds of cognitive, affective and 
evaluative orientations toward the political system in general, its input and output 
aspects, and the self as political actor” (Almond, Verba, 2000:22). The term “politi-
cal culture” includes a subjective relationship with politics, attitudes towards dif-
ferent models of political order and evaluation of political achievements. Gaiser et 
al. (2007) refer to conceptual framework of political culture by Almond and Verba 
and operationalize aforementioned three dimensions: relationship with politics as 
people’s interest in politics and information about political activities (indicators of 
input dimension); attitudes towards different models of political order as support 
of democratic attitudes (indicators of system dimension) and evaluation of political 
achievements as respondents’ trust in institutions (indicator of output dimension) 
(Gaiser et al., 2007). The focus of this text will be on these indicators of political 
culture of university students.
Methodology
The quantitative data used in the text were collected in 2004 as part of a scientific-
 research project Youth and European Integration Processes, Institute for Social Re-
search in Zagreb. The original basic sample of youth (N=2000) was stratified accord-
ing to socio-demographic attributes: gender, regional status and socio-professional 
status. The latter comprised four categories: university students, employed, unem-
ployed and high-school students. University students (N=446) were extracted from 
the basic sample of youth representatives (N=2000) and through random sampling 
a control group was extracted (N=532) from the remaining number of youth, which 
was then compared to the student sample2. Univariate and bivariate data analyses 
were used. The first was used to determine the answer distribution and the latter 
for calculating the significance of differences by using the χ2 test. Political culture 
of university students is portrayed along indicators of aforementioned three dimen-
sions: interest in formal politics, support for democratic values and attitudes and 
trust in institutions. The hypothesis is that political culture of university students 
differs from that of the other young people in our sample.
high school of 47.1% and junior college, university or higher of 11.9% of population in Croatia 
older than 15 (Central Bureau of Statistics, Croatia) while students’ fathers education level in 
our sample is: elementary school diploma or less in 5.4%, high school diploma in 54.6% and 
junior college, university diploma or higher in 24.9% of cases. These findings can point that 
university students are selected group concerning these elements of social background.
2 The sample consists of young people aged 15 to 29 and many differences among par-
ticipants can be explained by their age (Ilišin, Radin, 2007) but this article aims to detect 
certain specificities of university students in comparison to other young people. Whital, the 
students from this sample are averagely 22.6 and the other youth are 22.7 years old, so the 
age variable is not taken into account.
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Interest in political life
The first dimension of political culture analyzed is the input dimension of political 
system whose indicator is the interest in political life. Involvement in civil society 
activities can help citizens develop skills for effective citizenship and advocating 
interests (Badescu, Sum, Uslaner, 2004) but usually there is a problem of insuffi-
cient motivation of young people for political engagement. In communist regimes, 
collective actions were highly controlled and therefore some forms of grouping 
based on similar political or any public interests were almost impossible. One of 
explanations for decreased political involvement is that after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the increased economic inequalities as well as the social uncertainty were 
additional de-motivators for collective action (Badescu, Sum, Uslaner, 2004). An-
other is that the youth are generally distanced from formal political life, especially 
because of general skepticism towards institutional power and authority (Shah et 
al., 2007) emphasized by radical individualism (Kestilla-Kekkonen, 2009), which 
is seen, for example, in their low election voting. Although they are much better 
educated than their predecessors, new cohorts of the young are the most passive 
group in almost all aspects of formal political participation (Kestilla-Kekkonen, 
2009). Also, socialization process of today’s youth is marked by consumerism and 
competition and as they internalize these ideologies, the voting becomes an option 
rather than civic duty (Kestilla-Kekkonen, 2009). It can, therefore, be argued that 
new generations have internalized ideologies that are not in tune with traditional 
organization of politics. Some research show that other forms of participation such 
as informal political participation are more present nowadays, especially among 
the young, women and highly educated individuals who express their political 
views through their lifestyle, e.g. using political consumerism (Shah et al., 2007). 
Low interest in active participation in formal politics3 can be seen in membership 
of various public organizations. For example, only 3.8% of university students 
from our sample are members of a political party. Students are mostly members of 
sports organizations (17.7%) as well as of cultural organizations (7%). Percentage 
of all respondents that are members of other organizations such as youth, peace, 
environmental organizations, unions, and human rights organizations is below 6% 
for each organization. Regarding the low formal participation of university students 
and other youth in organizations, it can be concluded that they are prone to self-
marginalization in this respect, refusing to make a change within existing forms 
of formal participation.
3 Institute for Social Research in Zagreb conducted a qualitative scientific research 
(2008) on a representative sample of students of University of Zagreb. Students 
were asked to specify reasons for generally low political participation of youth and 
university students as its segment. Lack of faith in possibility of change, lack of 
interest in politics, distrust in politics, disrespect of youth and youth’s interest in 
other activities were recognized as reasons for apathy of students and other youth. 
Students’ answers point to their dissatisfaction with external reasons such as lack 
of credibility of social institutions and encouragement of youth’s political involve-
ment. But, they are also self-critical in this respect (Ilišin, 2008).
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Here, however, a cognitive aspect of political involvement of university students is 
presented. “The term ‘political involvement’ is frequently linked to the process of ac-
tively gathering political information (see Gabriel, 1986, p. 179) and the social aspects 
of political conversations (Inglehart, 1989, ch. 10)” (Gaiser et al., 2007:290). Respec-
tively, the degree of interest in political life through subjective evaluation, frequency 
of communication on political topics with close ones, way of gathering information 
and participating in social and political life of the society are presented.
Table 1
Interest in political life (%)
Degree of respondents’ 
interest in political life
Other youth Uni. students
Strong  9.2 15.1
Average 51.9 49.9
None 38.9 35.1
χ2=8,13; df=2; p=.017
Around 50% of university students and the same percentage of youth consider 
themselves to be averagely interested in political life (Table 1). A large percentage 
of each group, however, has no interest in those issues at all. The difference be-
tween the two is found in category “strong”, where students are more interested in 
political life than other youth.
Although political orientation is more of a socio-demographic characteristic, the 
following table conveys one of the various aspects of interest in political life – hav-
ing a political party preference (or not)4.
Table 2
Political orientation (%)
Political orientation Other youth Uni. students
Center-left  19.7  28.4
Center-right  33.4  29.3
Center   7.4   7.4
Other party   3.6   6.1
Do not know, do not support  35.9  28.8
Total 100.0 100.0
χ2=15.67; df=4; p=.003
4 Political parties were specified in the questionnaire but are here presented as political 
orientations.
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University students’ political orientation is almost evenly distributed along three 
lines – close to one third of this population are center-right and center-left sup-
porters as well as indifferent in choosing a preferable political party. Although 
little less than 30% of students are undecided or indifferent, students are still less 
indifferent than the rest of the youth. Also, compared to other youth, students are 
significantly more inclined to center-left political parties. There is a considerable 
segment of both groups that is made of young people who are either disappointed 
or indifferent. However, these percentages indicate higher level of political interest 
among students, since their choice is quite probably based on information about 
their preferred political party.
Table 3
Interest in information and conversations on political life (%)
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
 o
f 
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
Other youth Uni. students
Following political parties issues χ2=18.430; df=2; p=.000
Never 38.5 27.6
Sometimes 51.9 55.9
Often  9.5 16.5
Following foreign policy χ2=37.128; df=2; p=.000
Never 42.6 25.3
Sometimes 46.4 54.5
Often 11.0 20.1
Following local politics χ2=16.380; df=2; p=.000
Never 40.0 28.5
Sometimes 46.9 59.3
Often 13.1 12.2
Reading daily and weekly newspapers χ2=17.626; df=2; p=.000
Never  5.3  2.0
Sometimes 51.1 42.4
Often 43.6 55.6
Talking to friends about politics and society χ2=13.722; df=2; p=.001
Never 35.7 24.9
Sometimes 43.5 48.9
Often 20.8 26.3
Talking to parents about politics and society χ2=16.407; df=2; p=.000
Never 35.9 27.3
Sometimes 51.0 50.8
Often 13.1 21.9
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Interest in information and conversations on politics was analyzed through fre-
quency of following political parties, foreign policy and local policy issues; reading 
daily and weekly newspapers, talking to friends and parents about politics and 
society. Table 3 indicates that there are statistically significant differences in these 
six variables: university students are more frequently informed about political life 
and have conversations on the subject.
Most of both students and other youth sometimes practice these activities, which 
only confirms their average interest in politics noted above. University students, 
however, follow the issues related to political parties and foreign policy more often 
than other youth. Local politics is not that interesting to students but they do follow 
it more from time to time while 40% of the young never follow local politics. Uni-
versity students more often read newspapers, which implies that their involvement 
in gathering information on politics is much stronger than that of the other youth. 
Also, they communicate more on these topics with family and friends.
Acceptance of some democratic values and attitudes
Political culture expressed as orientation toward levels of system was analyzed and 
is here outlined as differences between the students and other youth with regard 
to acceptance of constitutional democratic values and democratic attitudes.
Values are ideas or beliefs regarding desirable goals and behaviors that can be 
organized in systems. Also, they direct our attitudes and behaviors (Ferić and Ka-
menov, 2007). These very important characteristics of values give them a special 
position in development of democracy research. Values, organized in a relatively 
stable system, affect attitude formation of individuals, so affirmation of democratic 
values as human rights, personal freedom etc. is equally important as sharing 
mutual attitudes on democratic order. Welzel, in his research, discusses the effect 
of mass attitudes on levels of democracy. The assumption is that when there are 
more widespread pro-democratic attitudes, the more likely is that a society attains 
and sustains high levels of democracy (Welzel, 2007). Welzel argues that “pro-dem-
ocratic mass attitudes should be conducive to democracy because they increase 
public support for pro-democratic forces and distract support from anti-democratic 
forces” (Welzel, 2007:399), so mass support plays a significant role in balancing 
these two important political forces. Where democracy is scarce, pro-democratic 
mass attitudes operate as a support factor which facilitates democracy attainment 
while in societies with higher democracy level, pro-democratic attitudes function 
as a support factor for democracy sustainment (Welzel, 2007). When the democrat-
ic attitudes are more widespread, there is higher possibility of pro-democratic mass 
actions to emerge which then help shift the power balance toward pro-democratic 
forces. These ideas point to the importance of democratic values and attitudes 
persistence in society for democracy to be stabile, however they are relevant for 
defining orientation toward democratic system, too. The type of orientation points 
to the political culture of university students.
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Table 4
A comparative outline of the acceptance of constitutional values (%)
Constitutional values Other youth Uni. students
Respect for human rights 92.7 94.1
Freedom 93.4 94.6
Equality 84.2 86.3
Social justice 82.7 83.6
Gender equality 79.8 79.7
Pacifism 76.4 77.5
Protection of nature and human environment 78.0 77.3
Inviolability of ownership 72.8 75.7
Ethnic equality 70.0 72.1
The rule of law 61.5 65.8
Democratic and multiparty system 59.1 61.9
The percentages show respondents that think of these values as “very important” 
(a four degree scale consists of answers from “very important” to “completely un-
important”). Although respondents weren’t aware that values of respect for human 
rights, freedom, inviolability of ownership, gender equality, social justice, equality, 
pacifism, protection of nature and human environment, democratic and multiparty 
system, ethnic equality and the rule of law were in fact values noted in Croatian 
constitution to be respected and protected, large majority of university students 
support them. Democratic and multiparty system and the rule of law are regarded 
as not very important, perhaps indicating disappointment in political protago-
nists5. Also, it is possible that political pluralism is thought to be self-understanda-
ble (Ilišin, 2007). All values that constitute democratic-liberal system of values are 
accepted on a declarative level. There are no statistically significant differences 
between students and other youth considering acceptance of democratic values.
5 Regarding perception of democracy level in Croatia, Institute for Social Research in Za-
greb made a qualitative research in 2008 where students of Zagreb University were asked 
to estimate the level of democracy of political order of Croatia. The results showed that stu-
dents are not agreed on this matter. Around 30% are very critical of the reached democracy 
meaning they think of Croatian political order as non-democratic. 25% think that democ-
racy is saturated with considerable non-democratic elements, 22% regard political order 
as democratic but needing to improve; 20% of students rejected to answer mostly because 
of lack of interest in political matters (Ilišin, 2008). These results point to high criticism of 
university students towards democracy in Croatia, meaning they think of it as insufficient in 
number of aspects. However, it shouldn’t be neglected that even fifth of respondents were 
not interested in answering the question.
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Table 5
A comparative outline of the acceptance of democratic attitudes (%)
Democratic attitudes
Other 
youth
Uni. 
students
Everyone has the right to express their opinion, even if the majority thinks opposite. 98.1 99.1
True democracy cannot be imagined without opposition 67.4 78.0
Every citizen has the right, if the need arises, to express his or her beliefs in the streets 71.0 77.9
Conflicts of different interest groups in our society are harmful to the general interest 
of the state 67.4 68.9
The interests of the whole nation must be above all specific interests 69.6 65.1
Every political party must have a chance of gaining power 65.1 63.0
The President, so far, has controlled actions of the Government to a legally allowed 
extent 56.8 56.0
The President, Parliament and the Government share the power in our Republic 
according to the law 56.5 53.7
The Parliament, so far, has controlled the actions of the Government to a legally 
allowed extent 43.6 46.3
Citizens have no right to strike if that disturbs the peace 46.3 38.1
The opposition’s duty is not to criticize the government, but to support its work 44.1 37.6
There are conflicts in every society that must be resolved by force 23.1 26.2
The Croatian constitution has its weaknesses, but it is the best compared to all the 
others 23.0 16.6
Table 56 shows that a vast majority of university students support most of demo-
cratic attitudes but not consistently. They believe that one has a right to express 
his/her opinion, which may or may not be accepted by the majority of citizens. 
They understand better that there is no democracy without opposition and give 
more support for the idea of public protests if the need arises. Interest groups, on 
the other hand, as well as their conflicts are mostly seen as harmful to the society 
which indicates that students see interest groups as ones that need to have a com-
mon interest and that is the benefit of the state. However, they are less in favor of 
subjecting specific interest to the interest of the state than other youth. Individuals 
are perceived to have “more rights” to accomplish their objectives regardless of the 
interests of state, while interest groups are perceived to possess more power than 
an individual and therefore have more responsibility to the society in sense of de-
creasing conflicts among themselves because of their harmful effects on the state. 
It is not recognized that interest groups and their conflicts, on the other hand, are 
6 Table 5 holds the distribution of affirmative answers since the question was dichoto-
mous.
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elements of democracy. Students are skeptical regarding successful Parliament’s 
control over Government. Also they are less doubtful about right to strike even if it 
disturbs the peace as well as opposition’s role to criticize the government. Students 
are more critical to option of resolving conflicts in society by force and to regard-
ing constitution to be the best compared to others.
Difference between students and youth is statistically significant (p<.05) in the fol-
lowing attitudes: True democracy cannot be imagined without opposition (χ2=13.22 
df=1; p=.000); Every citizen has the right, if the need arises, to express his or her 
beliefs in the streets (χ2=6.06; df=1; p=.015); Citizens have no right to strike if that 
disturbs the peace (χ2=6.61; df=1; p=.011) The opposition’s duty is not to criticize the 
government, but to support its work (χ2=4.26; df=1; p=.042); The Croatian constitu-
tion has its weaknesses, but it is the best compared to all the others (χ2=6.13; df=1; 
p=.015).
Students are more convinced of the importance of political opposition to a demo-
cratic society and its duty to be critical and not supportive of government. The 
other youth show a tendency to support the idea of harmonious political life which 
regards disagreements as threatening for the society as a whole (Ilišin, 2007). 
Students show more support to the right of expressing beliefs in the form of pub-
lic protests or demonstrations, even if it disturbs the peace. Also, they perceive 
Croatian constitution more critically. Although university students understand the 
functioning of democratic processes in politics better than the rest of the youth, 
there is a lot of room for the improvement of knowledge on democratic processes. 
Withal, attitudes regarding affirmation of the functioning of legislative and execu-
tive power also indicate a crisis of trust in political institutions’ performance.
Trust in institutions
In the concept of political culture, trust in institutions is an indicator of the output 
of political processes which describes respondents’ relation to democratic institu-
tions as well as evaluation of the achievements of politics.
Trust is, as Canttenberg and Moreno note, important for democratic governments 
since they cannot rely on coercion to the same extent as other regimes. There is 
a double-edged element inherent to political trust: democracy requires trust but 
also presupposes an active citizenry with a healthy skepticism of government. The 
citizenry should also have willingness to suspend trust and assert control over gov-
ernment in case their rights or democratic processes are violated (Cattenberg and 
Moreno, 2005). The decline of trust in institutions in new democracies, as these 
two authors argue, is linked to “post-honeymoon” trend or disillusionment and not 
to awakening of more critical citizenry. The research of Cattenberg and Moreno 
points to explanation of higher political trust influenced by well being or financial 
satisfaction and external efficiency or government responsiveness, both in societies 
of established and new democracies. Also, democratic attitudes and political inter-
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est are dimensions that significantly affect the level of political trust in new democ-
racies. Higher support for democratic attitudes and higher level of political interest 
can indicate higher trust in institutions (Cattenberg and Moreno, 2005). The level 
of trust in institutions held by students and youth is displayed in Chart 1.
Chart 1
The ranking scale of trust in institutions – other youth and university students (%)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Political parties
Croatian Government
Large companies
Public services
Croatian Parliament
Judiciary
Police
Labor unions
Television
The press
Radio
Army
Non-governmental organizations
President of the Republic
Church
Uni Students
Other youth
The participants answered on a five-degree scale and Chart 1 illustrates the answers 
for the degree “complete trust” (other answers were as follows: “trust”, “undecided”, 
“distrust”, and “complete distrust”). Generally, institutions are “completely trusted” 
in very low percentages. Church is the only institution quite highly positioned in 
the youth sample, which supports the fact that Church holds an important position 
in Croatia’s public arena. Church is completely trusted by 12.8%, the President of 
the Republic by 11.9% and non-governmental organizations by little less than 8% 
of students in our sample. Students are most distrustful of political parties, the 
Croatian Government, large companies and institutions of public services. Youth 
completely trusts Church (25.4%), television (14.7%) and the President of the Repub-
lic (11%) and distrusts political parties, public services, Croatian Government, and 
the Croatian Parliament. This can indicate not only respondents’ trust in institu-
tions as such, but it can point to their evaluation of institutions’ performance, too.
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Statistically significant differences (p<.05) between the two groups is found in 
their trust in television (χ2=28.661), police (χ2=13.139), Church (χ2=36.448), large 
companies (χ2=9.525) and non-governmental organizations (χ2=15.781). What the 
differences in trusting these four organizations have in common is that university 
students are less trustful, except in case of NGOs, where relations are opposite. 
Students are more distrustful to public institutions (public services, judiciary, and 
labor unions), media (TV, press, radio), institutions of protection (army and police) 
and institutions of political power (political parties, government, and parliament). 
These findings are indicative because NGO is the only organization of those of-
fered that students trust significantly more than the other youth. NGOs in Croatia 
are (or trying to be) usually very critical to institutions of power and the support 
of students in sense of their higher trust in NGOs reaffirms students’ critical atti-
tude to these institutions. President is the only one of several institutions of power 
that is trusted by somewhat more than 10% of respondents, while political parties, 
Government and the Parliament hold less than 5% each. Reason for President’s 
relatively high percentage of trust lies in the overall popularity of Croatia’s second 
president Stjepan Mesic throughout his 10-year mandate.
Conclusion
Transition from socialist to democratic political culture is a long and demanding 
process which requires adoption of a new value system and a new relation to the 
ruling system. It is logical to seek bearers of democracy in groups such as youth 
since they are, among other, the least burdened with the old socialist ideas of citi-
zenship and state. Croatian university students have higher democratic potential 
(Ilišin, 2007) than those who are not enrolled in the system of higher education, 
which could arguably be justified by their political culture. In other words, stu-
dents’ political culture should be different from the political culture of other young 
people. Using Almond and Verba’s conception of political culture as theoretical 
framework, this text intended to define differences that make university students 
more democratically potent than the rest of the young in the survey. Input, system 
and output dimensions of political system were described by interrelated indica-
tors: interest in politics, support for democratic values and attitudes and trust in 
institutions.
The survey showed that university students and other youth in Croatia strongly 
differ in some aspects of political culture, while they are, expectedly, quite similar 
in others. The students mostly show average interest in political life and they are, 
as opposed to other youth, more interested in at least two aspects of politics: com-
municating about and gathering information on political topics. Both university 
students and youth largely support main principles and values that are inseparable 
from democracy. Nevertheless, support for principles such as the rule of law and 
democratic and multiparty system are not recognized as important, possibly be-
cause respondents perceive them to be self-understanding for a democratic system. 
Regarding democratic attitudes, students are more likely to understand the com-
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petitiveness of politics whilst youth have a more harmonious view of politics. Also, 
students are more likely to support specific interests over national, which points 
to their awareness of the importance of individualistic dimension of democracy 
as opposed to collectivistic interests above individual. Last indicator of political 
culture analyzed was trust in institutions. This dimension is at the same time the 
only one where students had lower scores. The level of trust in institutions among 
university students is generally lower than that among the other youth who, in 25% 
of cases, have complete trust in Church (as well as 12% of students), indicating 
their traditional orientation. Taking into account that television is the second most 
trusted institution, it can be concluded that the youth are not particularly critical 
of the main source of information. On the other hand, they might be generally 
resigned because of disappointment in other institutions of power. The only insti-
tutions that students trust more than the youth are NGOs. That can indicate that 
students took a critical standpoint which reveals their distrustful attitude toward 
majority of institutions, especially political parties, government, companies, parlia-
ment, judiciary, police, unions and television.
To summarize, students have more interest in politics and higher acceptance of 
democratic values and attitudes, but they lack trust in institutions. These find-
ings indicate that university students in Croatia are not ideal representatives of 
democratic political culture, but compared to other youth, students have greater 
potential to contribute to the democratic processes. Therefore, the aim of future 
research in this field should be identification of university students’ political culture 
dynamics in the time period after 2004.
Also, in order to establish democratic political culture processes, it is necessary to 
emphasize that both students and other young people need some form of compul-
sory education on democracy and citizenship, which is missing in Croatia. On the 
other hand, it is not enough to aim only for “cultural adaption” of youth. Political 
elite should make considerable steps towards being more open and adaptable to 
the needs and standpoints of new generations.
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Izvorni znanstveni rad
A n j a  G v o z d a n o v i ć
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Neki indikatori političke kulture hrvatskih studenata
Sažetak
Rad se bavi političkom kulturom studenata. Analizirani su empirijski podaci dobiveni u 
kvantitativnom istraživanju provedenom 2004. godine u sklopu znanstveno-istraživačkog 
projekta Mladi i europski integracijski procesi Instituta za društvena istraživanja. Studenti 
(N=446) su izdvojeni iz osnovnog uzorka mladih (N=2000) te su uspoređeni sa slučajno 
izdvojenom kontrolnom grupom mladih (N=532). Kontrolna grupa mladih sastoji se od 
srednjoškolaca, zaposlenih te nezaposlenih. Politička kultura studenata opisana je indikato-
rima izvedenima iz teorijskog okvira Almoda i Verbe: interes za formalnu politiku, potpora 
demokratskim vrijednostima i stavovima te razina povjerenja u institucije. Analizom je 
utvrđeno da studenti, u odnosu na ostale kategorije mladih, pokazuju veći interes za poli-
tiku, u većoj mjeri prihvaćaju demokratske vrijednosti i stavove, no nedostaje im povjerenja 
u institucije. Ovi nalazi indiciraju da politička kultura studenata u odnosu na onu ostalih 
mladih ljudi, ima veći potencijal za doprinos demokratskim procesima.
Ključne riječi: politička kultura, studenti, mladi, povjerenje, demokratske vrijednosti, 
demokratski stavovi.
